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Introduction
One of the enduring controversies of corporate criminal liability
surrounds the basis of ascription of liability itself. The importance of finding
the most appropriate method of ascribing liability cannot be overstated. Not
only does it represent the intellectual foundation of corporate criminal liability,
it also may, in part, determine whether or not any system of corporate criminal
liability engenders widespread public support. Only in circumstances where
the basis of liability is seen to be fair and justifiable can broad endorsement
be expected. Consensus on the issue of the appropriate basis of liability has
so far eluded Anglo-American jurists. In England, of late, there has been
much criticism of the basis upon which the criminal liability of corporations
is determined. In Scotland there has been no such debate. 1 Indeed there has
been a perceptible reluctance to adduce on what basis criminal liability
attaches to the corporation for common law crimes.2 There appears to be little
or no independent line of thinking on the issue in Scotland where the judiciary
has essentially followed the English approach. 3 It is an approach which is
intellectually fraught and ultimately unsatisfactory. The situation is such that
it is relatively easy to support the proposition that:
'One of the most pressing tasks facing contemporary ethical and
Woolfson accuses Scottish academics of patrician disdain: see 'Rising Toll Of Deaths in the
Workplace' The Herald 27 November 1997.
See Stuart .'The Case of the Shameless Company' 1980 Vol 26 No 5, Journal ofthe Law Society
176; Ross 'Corporate Liability For Crime' 1990 Scots Law Times 265.
See PurcellMeats Ltd vMcLeod 1987 SLT 528 cf, Dean v John Menzies (Holdings) Ltd 1981 SLT
50.
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legal thought is the development of intellectually sound and
effective approaches for assessing the moral and legal implication
of individuals acting within the context of collectivities such as
corporations and of the actions and policies of these collective
entities themselves.'4
Gobert identifies four models of corporate criminal liability. 5 These
four 'models', or methods of ascribing liability, can be variously described as
vicarious liability, the 'identification' model, the 'aggregation' model and the
corporate fault model. 6 By way of amplification, Dan-Cohen offers (without
necessarily supporting them) two paradigms in the legal treatment of
corporations - the holistic view and the atomistic. Imputing intent from
individuals to the corporation is in his view atomistic in conception.7 The
modern academic trend has been away from such atomistic conceptions to a
holistic approach. The atomistic conceptions nonetheless have strong roots
in the common law jurisdictions and in different guises represent the approach
that they all take to the ascription of liability. The imputation of liability from
corporate agents at whatever level within the organisation betrays the
continued philosophical commitment to the inherent individualism of the
criminal law. Only when one is prepared to concede that the corporation as
a collectivity can be liable for its own criminal wrongs, does one veer towards
an altogether more holistic basis for the ascription of criminal liability.
Gobert's four models and Dan-Cohen's paradigms offer a useful template in
which to discuss the subject.
J Surber, 'Individual And Corporate Responsibility: Two Alternative Approaches', 1983,2, Business
and Professional Ethics Journal, 67-88 at p 67.
Gobert, 'Corporate Criminality: Four Models Of Fault' , 1994, 14, Legal Studies 393-410 at p 395
et seq.
'Developments In The Law. Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour Through Criminal
Sanctions', 1979 Harvard Law Review, 1229-1375, atpp 1242-3.
See Foerschler, 'Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward A Better Understanding Of Corporate
Misconduct', 1990,78, California LR 1287 at p 1298.
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Vicarious Liability
The first obvious attempts at ascribing criminal liability to corporations
were done on the back of the established civil law doctrine of vicarious
liability, Criminal vicarious liability naturally has its origins in the civil law
agency concept. 8 It is often rationalised on the basis of the proximity of
relationship between the corporation and its individual human actor. Gobert,
for example, argues that:
'[A]s an employer is responsible for selecting, trammg and
supervising the employee, not to mention placing the employee in
a position where the offence can be committed, should not the
employer also be responsible for the employee's crime? The case
for liability becomes even more compelling when the employee
has acted to benefit the company and the company has retained
the profits generated by the wrongdoing.'9
Similarly, it has been claimed, 'Criminal responsibility on the part of the
principal, for the act of his servant in the course of his employment, implies
some degree of moral guilt or delinquency, manifested either by direct
participation in or assent to the act, or by want of proper care and oversight,
or other negligence in reference to the business which he has thus intrusted to
another.'JO Fisse points out that there must be limitations of such an approach
See Kreisberg, 'Decision-Making Models And The Control Of Corporate Crime', 1976, 85 Yale
L! 1091 at p 1095; see 0 WHomes, 'Agency' 1891,68, Harvard L R 345-64; Wolfenden Report,
Chap 11 pp 9-10 quoted in J H E Williams, 'The Proper Scope And Function Of Criminal Law' ,
1958, 74,LQR 76-81 at p 76; Sayre, 'Criminal Responsibility For The Acts OfAnother', 1930,43,
Harvard LR, 689-723 at pp 689-694; KhaiUla, 'Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does
1t Serve?', 1996, 109, Harvard LR, 1477-1532 at p 1482; Lederman, 'Criminal Law, Perpetrator
And Corporation: Rethinking A Complex Triangle', 1985, 76, Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 285-340 at p 288; T. Baty, 'Criminal Vicarious Liability' in Vicarious Uability,
(1916); Winn, 'The Criminal Responsibility Of Organisations', 1929,3, Camb L!, 398-415 at p
398
Gobert, n 5 at p 396.
Colt J in Commonwealth vMorgan, 107 Mass 199,203-4 1871 quoted in Sayre, n 8 at p 711.
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in that the aims of civil and criminal law do not coincide. 1I Ashworth,
adopting a stance founded on public policy, explains that vicarious liability as
a foundation of criminal liability has its basis on 'pragmatism' and the
requirements of society. 12
The historic origins of respondeat superior dictated that someone would
be liable for the acts of another where they commanded it or procured it. 13
The problem was that procuring or commanding of a crime led to guilt
through doctrines of aiding and abetting in any case; 14 the enshrinement of
aiding and abetting as a criminal concept impeded the development of
criminal vicarious liability. Nonetheless, Sayre identified three exceptions to
the rule that there can be no criminal vicarious liability-nuisance, libel and
where statute expressly provides for it. 15 The third departure from the basic
principle remains of singular importance in the area of corporate crime in the
modem era. Where statute expressly provides for vicarious criminal liability
any common law rule will be displaced.
II
12
13
]j
Fisse, The Social Policy Of Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 1978,6, Adelaide LR, 361-412 at
p 366; Mueller, Mens Rea And The Corporation, 1957, 19, University 0/Pillsburgh LR, 21-48 at
p 39.
A Ashworth, Principles a/Criminal Law, (2nd ed., 1995) at p 113; see also H J Laski, The Basis
Of Vicarious Liability, 1916,26, Yale LR, 105-35 at p 113. Welsh, The Criminal Liability 0/
Corporations, 1946,62, LQR 345-65 at p 347; see also J L J Edwards, Mens Rea In Statutory
Offences, (1955), at p 217; see also G Stessons, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative
Perspective, 1994, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 493-520 at p 519.
Sayre, n 8 at pp 690-1.
Sayre, n 8 at p 649; see NCB v Gamble [1959] I QB 11 cf R v [)ai~v Mirror Newspapers Ltd
[1922] KED 530.
Sayre, n 8; see also Welsh, n 12 at pp 348 et seq.; see also R v St Lawrence Co'p, (1969) 2 OR
305 at p 320 'While in cases other than criminal libel, criminal contempt of court, public nuisance
and statutory offences of strict liability criminal liability is not attached to a corporation for the
criminal acts of its servants or agents upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, nevertheless, if the
agent falls within a category which entitles the court to hold that he is the vital organ of the body
corporate and virtually its directing mind and will in the sphere of duty and responsibility assigned
to him so that his action and intent are the very action and intent of the company itself: then his
conduct is sufficient to render the company indictable by reason thereof. It should be added that both
on principle and authority this proposition is subject to the proviso that in performing the acts in
question the agent was acting within the scope of his authority either express or implied.. see Sayre,
n 8 at pp 710-12; see Triplex Glass Co Ltd v Laneegay Safety Glass (1934) Ltd. 1939,2 KB 394;
Finburgh v Moss Empire Ltd.,1908,SC 928.
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Sayre draws a sharp distinction between what he calls 'true' crime and
petty misdemeanours. 16 He does so on the basis that respondeat superior
offends our deep seated notion that guilt is personal and individual where the
crime involves moral delinquency. This argument that all regulatory crime
does not involve moral obliquacy remains overly simplistic and as such an
unreliable basis on which to exclude vicarious liability from 'true crime.'
Sayre nevertheless captures the essence of our disinclination to embrace
vicarious liability. Ultimately, the ordinary citizen's perception of crime
remains of signal importance, and the offence engendered by the proposition
that criminal liability may attach through the actions of another ensures that
it can only be justified in certain circumstances. It cannot provide a universal
basis for the ascription of criminal liability.
In respect of corporations, vicarious liability may be justified because
it is directed to ensuring more internal policing. 17 The deterrence inherent in
vicarious liability revolves round greater shareholder and corporate officer
attention to the selection of officers and subordinates. 18 As a model of
liability, it certainly has utilitarian value in obviating problems of ascribing
liability where the wrong is committed by the lower level official. 19 Because
liability transmits through the wrongdoer to the corporation, individuals need
not be prosecuted. 20 That may not be a good precept on which to operate in
all circumstances; there will be many instances where the individual should
rightly be prosecuted in addition to the corporation. Vicarious liability may
also be justified on the basis of criminal law's chief aim of prevention and on
Sayre, n 8 at p 717.
L H Leigh, The Criminal Liability O/Corporations In English Law, (1969), at p 75; see also
James and Sons Ltd v Smee,[1954] 1 QBD 273 per Lord Parker at p 279.
18
20
Cf Welsh n 12 at p 286 believes, 'While an additional deterrent effect might be gained by applying
respondeat superior to all crimes of corporate agents, no characteristic pecnliar to corporations
demands exceptional measures. Large corporate assets combined with the possible financial
inesponsibility of the agent - in cases where a fine is imposed - are not legitimate reason for straining
established criminal concepts. '
A J Dnggan, 'The Criminal Liability Of Corporations For Contraventions Of Part V Of The Trade
Practices Act',1977 5 Australian Business LR 221-247 at p 222.
J S Parker, 'Criminal Sentencing Policy For Organisations', 198926 American Criminal LR ,at p
523.
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the legitimate criminal goal of compensation. 21
Notwithstanding its positive attributes, vicarious'liability has been the
subject of criticism based primarily on the injustice of vicarious liability and
its inefficiency in respect of corporate criminal liability. 22 There are many
who find vicarious liability as a basis of ascription of liability anathema to the
proper notion of criminal liability. Sayre, for example, has stated that,
'Vicarious liability is a conception repugnant to every instinct of the criminal
jurist.'23 Edwards similarly took the view that:
'So long as modern legislation continues to intrude itself into
every sphere of trading, business, health and social welfare
activities, laying down elaborate codes of conduct to be observed
by responsible officials so, too, the doctrine of vicarious liability
will continue to be an evil necessity. But each gesture on the. part
of the judiciary and of the legislature which refuses to extend the
obnoxious principle is to be applauded. ,24
Another major objection to respondeat superior as the basis for
corporate criminal liability is adduced in a Harvard Law Review note which
points out that:
'Once respondeat superior is applied to crimes, however, the
stigma of conviction becomes weakened as the public begins to
recognise that criminal liability may not signify lack of good faith
See Coffee, 'Corporate Criminal Responsibility' in Kadish, Encyclopaedia O/Crime And Justice
Vall, (1984), at p 257.
22
24
Coffee, n 21 at p 257.
Sayre, n 8 at p 717; Khanna, n 8 at p 1485. Holt himself rejected criminal vicarious liability in
Hem v Nichols 1 Salk 289 (1708). The question of criminal respondeat superior was posed and
clearly repudiated in Rex v Huggins 2 Strange 882 (1730); see also see R v Holbrook 4 QBD 42
(1878); Chisolm v Doulton 22 QBD 736 (1889); Hardcastle v Bielby [1892J 1 QB 709; see Gail'
v Brewster 1910 SLT 36 per Lord Justice General at p 38
Edwards, n 12 at p 243.
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on the part of corporate management. ,25
Gobert offers some understanding of the difficulty in using vicarious
liability as a model for criminal liability.26 The practical difficulty in
supervising what may be thousands of employees represents an enormous
burden on an employer. In Gobert's view supervision can be supplanted by
policy formulation designed to ensure that employees and the company remain
within the confines of the law. Vicariously liability as a fault attribution
model retains the problem that a company may become criminally liable in
circumstances where the majority of its employees have not broken the law
and the company has taken reasonable (or indeed exemplary) steps to prevent
criminal conduct. According to Leigh, respondeat superior cannot be
considered to be a satisfactory general basis of liability.27 It is inherently
unfair in that liability might ensue even in circumstances where the company
has expressly forbidden the act. One of the other key deficiencies of vicarious
liability as the basis on which to ascribe corporate criminal liability is the fact
that it only impacts on the actus reus of the crime. As Gobert explains, 'courts
that are prepared to attribute an employee's act to the company may balk at
attributing the employee's mental state as well. 128 Writing in 1978, Fisse
argued that ,[A]lthough states of mind are now attributable personally to
corporations under the identification principle, the results of applying that
principle are so dysfunctional that vicarious liability retains much vitality.'29
This may in part explain the continued recourse to vicarious liability as a
model of corporate liability in certain spheres. For all its truth, it represents
a somewhat impoverished rationale for vicarious liability as a universal basis
of corporate criminal liability.
Vicarious criminal liability continues to be found in many statutory
Note: 'Criminal Liability Of Corporations For Acts Of Their Agents', 194660 Hmvard LR,83-289
at I' 286
26 Gobert, n 5 at I' 397.
Leigh, n 17 at I' 118 01' cit.
Gobert, n 5 at I' 399.
Fisse n 11 at I' 366.
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criminal offences. In the United Kingdom the position in respect of these
regulatory offences is well settled; vicarious liability applies in respect of strict
liability offences and now also to offences of negligence or hybrid offences
(those providing due diligence or reasonable knowledge test)30 Despite
several early cases where vicarious liability was used as the underpinning
model of criminal fault, other than in strict liability statutory offences there
appears to be little current enthusiasm for pursuing this as a basis of corporate
criminal liability. An illustration of such reluctance is to be found in the
relatively recent case of Seaboard Marine Offshore Ltd v Secretary ofState
for Transport. 31
There is evidence that some courts have not entirely ruled out the
application of the concept of vicarious liability in corporate criminalliability32
However in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities
Commission,33 the Privy Council again rejected vicarious liability as the basis
of corporate criminal liability, holding that a person of high standing had to
be found within the company whose acts and knowledge can be attributed to
the company34 Nevertheless, vicarious liability remains a vital part of the
corporate criminal liability equation where it is clearly required in specific
statutory offences. 35 The expansion of regulatory offences has in this context
significant importance. The real problem in adopting an expansive approach
extending vicarious liability beyond specific regulatory offences, is that
'vicarious liability for serious crime is at variance with fundamental values
WeUs, 'Cry In The Dark: Corporate Manslaughter And Cultural Meaning' in Loveland (1995) at p
I II; Wright v Ford Motor Co [1967] I QB 230; Gammon (HK) Ltd vA-G o/Hong Kong [1984]
2 AU ER 503.
31
33
[1994] 2 AU ER 99.
National Rivers Authority v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd,The Times, 3 FeblUary 1994; Re
Supply o/Ready Mixed Concrete [1995] 1 All ER 135.
[1995]3 AU ER 918.
See however the confusing dicta of Lord Hoffinan [1995] I AU ER 918 at p 928.
MueUer, n 11 at p 21.
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embedded in both common law and civil systems. '36 For all this it remains
useful in respect of certain statutory offences and as such might well be
retained in respect of those particular crimes as part of our system of corporate
criminal liability on the basis of pragmatism and efficacy.
The Identification Doctrine
The second 'model' of criminal liability proffered by Gobert and
discussed in a plethora of writings is what is known as the 'identification
theory.' The essence of this theory is that the corporation attains criminal
liability through a direct connection between the company and the person
responsible for the criminal harm; an individual or individuals are of sufficient
standing that they are 'identified' with the company. This model of criminal
liability is often referred to as the 'controlling mind theory' or the 'alter ego'
doctrine. 37 As a method of ascribing criminal liability it is most famously
expounded in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass. 38 However, development
of the concept can be traced to earlier cases. Lord Denning argued in H L
Bolton Co Ltd v TJ Graham and Sons Ltd 39 that,
'[A] company may in many ways be likened to the human body.
It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It
also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with
directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company
are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to
do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will.
Others are directors and managers who represent the directing
mind and will of the company and control what it does. The state
of mind of those managers is the state of mind of the company
36 L H Leigh, 'lhc Criminal Liability OfCorporations And Other Groups: A Comparative View' ,1982
80,Michigan LR.1508-1529 at p 1514.
See Farrar, Farrar's Company Law, (3rdEd, 1991) at pp 759-760; see also Wings Ltd yEWs
[19851 I AC 272
[1972] A C 153
r1957] 1 Q13 159
39
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and is treated by law as such.'
Wells40 pinpoints three earlier cases as being significant in the adoption
of the alter ego doctrine - DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors,41 R v fCR
Haulage,42 and Moore v Bresler. 43 However, one can go back further to an
even earlier authority to see both the formulation of the idea of an 'alter ego'
doctrine and its relationship with vicarious liability. In Lennard's Carrying
Company Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd 44 Viscount Haldane said,
'[A] company is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any
more than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will
must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for
some purpose may be called an agent, but who is really the
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and
centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may be
under the direction of shareholders in general meeting; that
person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in
some companies it may be so, that the person has an authority to
co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him to co-
ordinate under the articles of association. It must be upon true
construction ofthat section in such a case as the present one that
the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or
agent for whom the company is liable because his action is the
very action of the company itself.'
The modem authority generally accepted as the leading case in the
United Kingdom on the 'alter ego' doctrine is Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v
Natrass. In this case the company was charged with an offence under section
"
42
43
C Wells. 'Corporations Culture, Risk And Criminal Liability',1993,Criminal LR 551-566 at p 559.
[1944] I KB 146.
(1944) 30 Cr App R 31
[1944] 2 All ER 515.
[1915J AC 705.
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11(2) of the Trades Description Act 1968. The substance of the offence was
that the company had advertised goods for sale at a price less than the price
on the goods actually for sale. Evidence disclosed that a branch of the
company had run out of specially priced items and they had been replaced
with similar items at their normal price and that the company's branch
manager had authorised the action taken. As a consequence the goods on
display were more expensive than the advertised price of the goods. Section
24 of the 1968 Act offers a defence to a section 11(2) charge. It states:
'In any proceedings for an offence under this Act it shall ... be a
defence for the person charged to prove - (a) that the commission
of the offence was due to... the act or default of another
person... and (b) that he took all reasonable precautions and
exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of such an
offence.'
Section 20 of the same Act states that:
'where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a
body corporate is proved to have been committed with the
consent and connivance of. .. any director, manager, secretary or
other similar officer of the body corporate... he as well as the
body corporate shall be guilty of that offence.'
The company sought to rely upon the defence in the statute arguing that
it had exercised due diligence and that the manager was 'another' for the
purposes of the Act. In accepting the company's contention the House of
Lords held that the manager was not sufficiently senior to constitute the
'controlling' mind of the company45 The decision in Tesco Supermarkets v
Support for Lord Reid's Natrass approach is invariably drawn lrom the Canadian case of R v 5t
Lawrence Corporation (1969) 2 a R 305 where Schroeder J A said, "if an agent falls within a
category which entitles the Court to hold that he is a vital organ of the body corporate and virtually
its directing mind and will in the sphere of duty and responsibility assigned to him so that his action
and intent are the very action and intent of the company itself, then his conduct is sufficient to render
the company indictable by reason thereof It should be added that both the principle and authority
this proposition is subject to the prl'>Viso that in perfonning the acts in question the agent was acting
within the scope of his authority either express or implied."
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Natrass has attracted considerable criticism. For example Gobert claims that:
'[T]he test of Natrass is under inclusive in that the range of
persons within a large company who will possess the relevant
characteristics to render the company liable will inevitably be a
rather small percentage of those who work for the company. The
consequence is that the company will be able to escape criminal
liability for most acts of its employees. In large companies such
as Tesco there will be many layers of management. No one
person or persons at the centre can be expected to oversee the
daily affairs of the hundreds of supermarkets which the company
operates. Day-to-day decisions will perforce have to be entrusted
to local managers. Yet this discretion, because it relates to the
implementation of policy rather to its formulation, will not be
sufficient to bring the branch manager within the test of Natrass.
Under Natrass a business is inevitably converted into a legal
defence. Further, by their decision their Lordships encourage a
management structure which favours devolved decision-making,
not for the theoretical merit, but because it will help to insulate
the company from criminal liability. ,46
Natrass represents a crude distinction between the 'hands' and 'brains' of
the company. The distinction is a simple one and, for some commentators,
one ill-suited to modem complex command structures. The actus reus of the
crime is more likely to be committed at a much lower level than director level.
Trying to match the actus reus committed by a lower level employee with the
mens rea of higher level employees has a certain inconsistency of approach.
Gobert again argues:
'One of the prime ironies of Natrass is that it propounds a theory
of corporate liability which works best in cases where it is needed
least and works least in cases where it is needed most. The
directors and managers of small companies who are most likely
to satisty the Natrass test are also likely to be directly involved in
Gobert, n 5 at p 400.
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carrying out of the company's affairs and thus criminally liable in
their own right; vicarious and corporate liability are largely
superfluous for deterrent purposes. In large companies, on the
other hand, there is far less likelihood of personal involvement
by senior management in day-to-day activities. As a result, the
possibility of personal criminal liability is not much of a deterrent
while the Natrass test frustrates efforts to impose corporate
liability. ,47
Muir notes that Natrass creates a discriminatory rule in favour of the
larger employer. 48 In addition he further notes one of another of the
unfortunate consequences ofNatrass and that is 'If the corporation can expect
to escape liability on proof of a servant's fault it may be less inclined to do no
more than maintain an adequate "paper" system for presentation to the court
as evidence of due diligence on its part or perhaps of the defendant being
"another person".,49 Field and Jorg criticise the identification doctrine on the
basis that it does not adequately reflect the limits of corporate moral
responsibility50 In their view, to limit it to high-ranking corporate actors is
unduly restrictive and that, priorities in hierarchical organisations like
corporations are set predominately from above. It is those priorities that
determine the social context within which a corporation's shop-floor workers
and the like make decisions about working practices. A climate of safety or
unsafety may permeate the entire organisation but be created at the highest
level. Thus, if criminal law is to reflect this moral responsibility, in
appropriate cases legal responsibility ought to extend to acts done by the
'hands' of the corporation. Fisse is also critical of the identification theory
describing it as a:
47
48
49
GOhCI1, n 5 at p 401
Muir, 'Teseo Supermarkets, Corporate Liability And Fault', 1973,5 New Zealand Universities LR
357-372.
Muir, n 48 at p 367.
S Field and N Jorg, 'Corporate Liability And Manslaughter: Should We Be Going
Dutch?', I99 1,Crim LR 156-171 at p 159.
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'vision which is blind to organisational theory and practice
[amounting] to an anthropomorphic illusion...The truth is that
corporations are materially different from human persons both in
constitution and being. To rely upon anthropomorphic
assumptions at the expense of corporate reality is simply to
succumb to the myth of the metaphor.'51
One of the perceived problems of the identification theory is that
following the Natrass decision there is clear authority for suggesting that only
those at the very core of the corporation may impute guilt to it. s2 So far, as one
writer has pointed out '[n]o indication is apparent for what criteria are to be
employed in determining who falls within the "inner circle". ,53 Plausibly each
situation may tum on its merits but there is no authority to that effect from the
House of Lords or the Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal. What then might
be the criteria for 'identification'? Stem offers several criteria for defining the
'organ' which will attach liability. First, rather unhelpfully Stem offers 'vague
description' as one means of identifYing the appropriate individuals. There is
little difficulty in finding support for this vague rather haphazard approach.
The case law, particularly English case law, points to the court offering up
such nebulous concepts as 'the very ego and centre', 'the directing mind and
will' or 'control centre' or corporate 'brains' or the 'primary organs'. As Stem
suggests there is frustration in defining the organ as something more than
other employees of the corporation. 54 It has been suggested that the primary
organs test dictates that the criminal mind is to be located in the minds of
'those agents who can act under the direct authority of the constitutional
document and regulations of the corporation without the intervention of any
Fisse, n 11 at p 366.
52
54
Wells, 'A Quiet Revolution In COIporate Liability For Crime', 1995,145 NU 1326-1327 at p 1326;
cf Henshall (Quarries) Ltd v Hmvey,1965,2 QB 233; R v Weathelloil Ltd [1972]1 All lOR 65;
see also Schaff, n 43.
Y Z Stem, 'Corporate Criminal Personal Responsibility - Who Is The Corporation?', I987,13
Journal ofCorporation Law 125-43 at p 131.
Stem, n 53 at p 132', DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd, supra.
44
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
further human act. '55 Such a test was advanced by Lord Diplock in Natrass.
The test itself suffers from the same issues which Natrass generally raises.
Primary organs may have very little direct input into the actings of the
company. They may exercise nothing more than mere approval. Others
within the organisation may exercise considerable power and indeed may be
considered organs of the company without being primary organs of the
company. Conversely, lower-order officials may have significant powers in
modern bureaucracies. Such officials might not be named in corporate
documents but may, nonetheless, exercise considerable power. It seems fairly
obvious that primary organs are not the sole organs particularly in complex
modern bureaucracies. Fisse criticises Lord Diplock's confinement of
corporate officers to the formal constitution as resting on the patently false
assumption that a corporation's constitution reflects the true nature of its
managerial functions. 56 The maj or appeal of such a test is the certainty that
it offers in identification. Only those expressly named in company documents
would have the power to attach criminal liability to the company. The
limitations of this approach are self-evident; a company could evade liability
by being economical with the number of named officials. Equally
objectionable is the notion that the company alone may determine who can
create criminal liability. Policy considerations in criminal law dictate that the
State should determine the parameters of criminal liability and it clearly
offends that concept were the corporation to self-regulate its liability by
narrowing the numbers of individuals who may be identified with the
corporation.
An alternative test offered by Stern is the delegation test. 57 This test
retains a linkage to company documentation. The nexus with the company
documents conveys an image of certainty and express identification. In this
Powell, The Law OfAgency, (1961).
Fisse, 'Consumer Protection And Corporate Criminal Responsibility: A Critique Of Tesco
Supermarkets v Natrass', 1971,4 Adelaide LR 113-129 at p. 121; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v
Nalrass per Lord Diplock at p 199 'The obvious and only place to look to discover by what natural
persons its powers are exercisable, is in the constitution. '; see also Seaboard Marine Offshore Ltd
v Secretary of State for Transport [1994] 2 All ER 99 at p 104; for a full discussion of the
distinction between manager and officer see R v Boal [1992] 3 All ER 177.
Stem, n 53 at p 133.
45
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
instance identification with the company would be through those thought to
have delegated from the company documents. The flaw in such a test is the
lack of precision. The flexibility it introduces permits courts to deduce in the
given circumstances who has the delegated authority. The lack of precision
reduces the test to little more value than the vague description approach
currently adopted by the courts.
Stern thirdly, offers the 'authorised acts test'. 58 Here one inevitably
observes the language of vicarious liability rooted in the law of agency.
Identification is with the acts authorised by the primary representatives rather
than those carried out by them. As a consequence any employee of the
organisation might be identified as the mind of the company. Unlike the other
tests this one has its affinity to the acts perpetrated rather than the individuals.
In this sense it is less anthropomorphic in conception. The authorised acts
test's primary flaw lies in the fact that only directly authorised acts attach
criminal liability; generally authorised acts will not attach liability. Even if the
test had some merit it would nonetheless raise questions as to the mode of
authorisation and more importantly, unauthorised acts. Though Stern makes
no mention it is possible that acts need not be expressly authorised. There
may be implied authorisation under the agency doctrines of apparent or
ostensible authority and holding out.
Another of Stern's tests - 'corporate selection test' - is in many respects
similar to the primary organs test in that it permits the corporation to
determine who the organs are. The approach entails the corporation filing
with State authorities (obviously Companies House in the UK) documents
identifying the organs by name or position. The poverty of this as a basis of
identification is obvious; the criticisms which pertain to some of the earlier
tests are apposite. This approach would amount to nothing more than self-
regulation and would in the opinion of the writer prove so ineffectual as to be
meaningless.
Stern also offers what he calls 'a pragmatic approach'59 Arguably, the
current approach of the British courts is one based on pragmatism. The
strength and weakness of such an approach is adequately described by Stern
58
59
Stern,n53 atp 133.
Stern, n 53 at p 134.
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who contends 'its strategy might give more substance to the abstract
descriptions of the organ, while softening the formal criteria's intransigence.'
The pursuit of a suitable test however is premised on the premise of greater
certainty. Abstraction clearly cannot achieve this and for that reason alone
this test must be of limited value for those in pursuit of definition.
Pragmatism as a test, if such a test exists, may require certain constraining
features which for the purposes of this study may be described as sub-tests.
Stern concludes that:
'[T]he common goal of all the criteria analysing the hierarchy of
the legal body is to identitY those individuals who are sufficiently
important in the corporate hierarchy that their will and acts might
be considered those of the corporation itself. The complex task
is to draw the exact line in the hierarchy which separates
individuals who are the ego ofthe corporation from those who are
merely its representative. '60
This may be so for those supportive of the identification theory. Stern's
approach is to find a test which works within that context. Others have sought
a different formulation entirely for the ascription of criminal liability. Stern,
in an effort to make the pragmatic test work, offers two constraining reference
points: analysis of hierarchy and analysis of function. Illustration of the
pragmatic approach in respect of hierarchy can be found in the Model Penal
Code in America which states that:
'A corporation may be convicted ofthe commission of an offence
if and only if... (c) the commission of the offense was authorised,
requested, commanded, or performed by the board of directors,
or by an agent having responsibility for formation of corporate
policy, or by a high managerial agent having supervisory
responsibility over the subject matter of the offence and acting
within the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation.'
Like most hierarchical analysis, the Model Penal Code fails to
60 Stem. n 5:1 at p 1:15
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differentiate the real policy makers61 Another major criticism is the inequality
in merely ascribing liability on the basis offunction. 62 Nonetheless, analysis
by function may ironically be more utilitarian than pragmatism.63 Here one
considers not who the individual is but what he does regardless of his position
in the hierarchy. Even shadow directors may act in a way which may incur
criminal liability for the corporation. This seems more truly a pragmatic
approach. Of equal importance is whether the function performed is of the
corporation or for the corporation. In the spirit of true pragmatism Stern
offers a solution to the inherent deficiencies of the hierarchical and function
tests and that is to combine both. 64
Kelly also notes the difficulty of identifying individuals to whom to
attach corporate liability under alter ego doctrine. His solution is a definition
in terms of control and management which he believes would address the
differential that exists between different corporations. 65 What about persons
who manipulate the company without occupying a formal position in it? Will
they be liable under the identification theory. Leigh, following the line in R
v St Lawrence Corp, adopts the view that it is correct to restrict the
identification theory to employees acting within the scope of their emploYment
or their authority. Leigh's argument is that:
'The doctrine of identification originated as a device to ascribe
personal liability to corporations where this was necessary in
order to hold them civilly liable. In criminal law, however, it
tends to be assumed that the doctrine means that for all purposes
of criminal liability a corporation possesses a mind - that of its
controllers. But a court could return to the original root and hold
Stem, n 53 at p 136.
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Welsh, n 12 at p 360.
The fimction test was developed by Professor Barak, 'The Status Of The Entity In Torts', 1966,22
Hapraklit 198 at pp 204-7.
Stem, n 53 at p 140.
Kelly, 'Corporate Manslaughter And UK Common Law: Lessons To Be Leamed From Our
Experience?', 1991, 6 OGLTR 177-87 atp 179.
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that the doctrine of identification should apply only where for
policy reasons it is necessary to hold a corporation liable. ,66
Certainly the distinction between vicarious liability and primary liability
is both significant and relevant. Writing before the landmark case of Natrass,
Fisse indicated that:
'[0 ]nce a distinction is drawn between primary and vicarious
liability it clearly follows that the conduct of some servants or
agents cannot be imputed to a corporation where primary liability
is imposed. Authority is to the effect that primary (as opposed to
vicarious) liability may be imposed in respect of the conduct of a
managing director, a general manager, and even a secretary.
Obviously primary liability would be imposed in respect of the
conduct of either the general meeting or the board of directors.
However, no clear discrimination between superior and inferior
agents or servants emerges from the case law.'
Edgerton had earlier offered a rationale in favour of primary liability.
In his view it would enhance the notion of deterrence if the corporation was
held directly criminally liable. Moreover, it would operate to influence
shareholders and higher officials to subordinate lower-ranking officials.
Finally, Edgerton saw the advantage in primary liability in the fact that it
would overcome the need to identifY the person who commits the actus reus67
Fisse is critical ofEdgerton's view on the basis that the latter's position offered
no thesis as to why corporate criminal liability should be expanded more
widely than individualliability.68 In respect of Edgerton's third point, it is
interesting to note that Fisse was critical on the basis that it may lead to the
elimination of mens rea from offences simply because it is difficult. The
Leigb, 'The Criminal Liability Of Corporations and other Groups', 1977, 9 Ottawa L R 247-302 at
p 261.
67 Edgerton, 'Corporate Criminal Responsibility', 1927 ,36 Yale Law Jau1'Ilai 827-844.
Fisse, 'The Distinction Between Primary and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability', 1967,41
Australian L J 203-210.
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experience since Fisse's early thesis has not borne out his criticism. Indeed,
deeper analysis points to the fact that identification with all corporate agents
and servants need not of necessity result in the dispensing of the requirement
of mens rea where the alleged crime has such a requirement. The attribution
of primary liability in the modem era has been indicative of a desire to root
out the criminal mind within the corporation and not to eliminate mens rea as
a requirement altogether. Fisse's conclusion in 1967 was that 'primary
liability... should be imposed only in respect of the conduct of the general
meeting, the board of directors and less clearly the managing director.' That
conclusion represented a prognosis which the House of Lords in Natrass
seemed relatively eager to adopt.
It has been suggested that 'The simplest and most sensible explanation
is that the identification liability is a modified form of vicarious liability under
which the liability of a restricted range of personnel is imputed to the
corporation. 069 The English Law Commission's Working Paper No 44 argued
for an extension to the identification theory so that corporate actors other than
board members would be included. Their formulation was to include those
managers where the management function delegated was substantial. 70 In
New Zealand there are authorities which offer an interesting contrast with
Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass. In Meulens Hair Stylists v Commissioner for
Inland Revenue7! the court adopted a test of 'responsible servant' (in this case
the company secretary). Similarly, in Upper Hutt Motor Bodies Ltd v CIR72
McGregor J emphasised the notion ofempowerment rather than the corporate
brain idea. 73 Contrast this with the UK decision in R v Redfern and Dunlop
Ltd 74 where it was held that the European Sales Manger of Dunlop (Aviation)
69
71
"
73
Colvin, 'Corporate Personality And Criminal Liability', 1955,6 Criminal Law FonJln 1-44 at p 13
Andrews, 'Refonn In The Law Of Corporate Liability', 1973, Crim LR 91-97 at p 96
[1963] NZLR 797
[1964] NZLR 953.
See also Morris v Wellington City [1969] NZLR 1038; Sweetman v Industries and Commerce dept
(1970] NZLR 139 where Richmond J held that the internal arrangements between the hands and the
brains were irrelevant and that directors could not hide behind ignorance.
(1993) Crim LR 43
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Ltd was not sufficiently senior to be the alter ego of the company. However,
two recent cases have accepted the attribution of knowledge to lower level
officials : Tesco v London Borough ofBren[5 and El Ajou v Dollar Land
Holdings Plc. 76 In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v London Borough ofBrent the
company was charged with an offence contrary to section 11(11) of the Video
Recordings Act 1984 whereby one of their employees sold a video classed '18'
to a 14-year old. Saughten LJ offered the view that it was 'absurd to suppose
that those who manage a vast company would have any knowledge or any
information as to the age of a casual purchaser of a video film. It is the
employee that sells the film at the check out point who will have knowledge
or reasonable grounds for belief. It is her knowledge or reasonable grounds
that are relevant.' Such a view is difficult to reconcile with the Natrass
doctrine and illustrates the incoherence of adopting the Natrass approach. In
El Ajou, Nourse LJ adopted a practical view of a complex financial fraud and
in the process held that it was not the board of directors that was the
controlling mind but the person who had de facto management. According
to Nourse 'the authorities show clearly that different persons may for different
purposes satisfy the requirements of being the company's directing mind and
will.' In Camden London Borough Council v Fine Fare Lt(r a slightly
different approach was adopted. The case essentially endorsed the Natrass
view that it was the directors who were the controlling mind but Glidewell J
suggested that officers below the rank of director might be in a position to
indicate what the state of mind of the directors was. In R v Redfern and
Dunlop Ltcf8 the court re-emphasised the notion of control, claiming that
'administrative or executive functions which did not confer true power of
management and control would be insufficient.' These most recent cases
illustrate the clear problems that a strict interpretation of the Natrass doctrine
creates. There is no certainty in just who the controlling mind of the
corporation is. In the process of seeking accommodations with the Natrass
[1993] 2 All ER 718.
r1994J 1 BCLC 464.
[1987J QBD BILC 317
'8 (1993) Crim LR 43 at p 45
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philosophy the case law is becoming confused and confusing. In respect of the
Natrass doctrine Wells claims that:
'The idea that only certain people act as the company presents a
problem over and above the difficulties attending any such line-
drawing exercise. While the company is at one level a "fiction" it
is at another real. Once individuals in the company do anything
which is part of the greater enterprise of which they are a part,
then they contribute to the corporate effect. Whatever the branch
manager ofTesco did with special offers... he was only able to do
so because the company had invested and maintained the shop,
the supplies to it, the posters advertising the offer and so on.
When the Assistant Bosun on the Herald of Free Enterprise slept
instead of doing his job, he was caught up in a past, presentand
future, a network of obligations and implications, which the
corporation for which he worked provided not only the equipment
and the raison d'etre but also the operating rules and procedures.
The notion that some working within that structure act as that
corporation while others do not is flawed and requires re-
examination in the context of imposing criminal liability. 09
Quite simply the identification theory ignores the reality of modem
corporate decision-making which is often the product of corporate policies and
procedures rather than individual decisions. 8o Both the Hidden Report into the
Clapham Junction Railway Disaster and the Fennell Report into the Kings
Cross Fire, as well as the Sheen Report into the Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster
illustrate how processes for decision-making at the highest level contributed
to failures of subordinates which led to major incidents. 8l It seems trite to
N
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Wells, n 40 at p 560.
C Clarkson, 'Kicking Corporate Bodies And Damning Their Souls', 1996,59 Modern LR 557 at p
561
Hidden Report (1989) Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident, Crn 820 (London
. HMSO); Fennel Report (1988) Investigation into the Kings Cross Underground Fire Crn 499
(London: HMSO)', Sheen Report (l987)MVHerald ofFree Enterprise.' Report ofthe Court No
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suggest that organisational contexts and collective processes considerably
influence the actions of minor individuals within those organisations. All of
those disasters displayed a measure of acceptance primarily through ignorance
and indifference and casualness. In all the situations there was no question
that the corporations had the power to influence or control what the
subordinates were doing.
The identification theory is not without its supporters;82 in Britain it
retains a pivotal position as the main method of ascribing liability for common
law crimes and those statutory crimes which require mens rea. As a doctrine
it has undergone little modification since it was first mooted in 1915.83 For
all that, it should not 'occasion surprise that scholars elsewhere refuse to treat
liability ascribed through identification or high managerial agent as truly
personal... To many European scholars... the common-law systems seem to
have set the theoretical problems aside rather than to have solved them. ,84
Fisse argues that identification should be abandoned as not coinciding with the
possible justifications of corporate criminal responsibility.8s Natrass prevents
imposition of liability where it is justified and allows imposition where it is
unnecessary.86 More significantly, the Natrass principle fails to reflect the
concept of organisational blameworthiness so inherent in much of
corporation's criminal conduct. 87
The Aggregation Model
The aggregation model represents an extension to the identification
82
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In 1985 The English Law Commission published a Draft Code of the Criminal Law which
incorporated an earlier (1972) Working Party Report into Corporate Criminal Liability. In the Code
they opted to retain the alter ego doctrine. ( see Kelly, n 65 at p 177).
Kelly, n 65 at p 178
Leigh, n 36 at p 1527
Fisse, n 56 at p 127.
Fisse, n 56 at p 127.
Fisse, 'Recent Developments In Corporate Climinal Law And Corporate Liability To Monetary
Penalties', 1990, 13 University ofNew South Wales J 1-41 at p 3.
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model whereby the criminal mind is identified in the collectivity of corporate
personnel. Stone explains the essence of aggregation claiming:
'All that is needed... is the stipulation that some critical mass of
members of any aggregate collectivity has collective power with
respect to most outcomes of the matters in which the collectivity
has collective power... each member of that critical mass sub-
group has some individual power as well with respect to those
matters... in actual cases group dynamics and the personal power
over others of individual members may serve to exclude certain
members from ever being in the critical mass... Allowing that we
may have to exclude certain members who are notably weak or
under the influence of others, we may say that if an aggregate
collectivity has collective power with respect to some matter, each
member of the aggregate has some individual power with respect
to that matter; that is, none are powerless.'88
The aggregation theory has American ancestry89 The leading American
case is US v TIME-DC Inc90where the court said,
'[K]nowledge acquired by employees within the scope of their
employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a
corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the
information obtained by several employees was not acquired by
anyone individual employee who then should have
comprehended its full import. Rather the corporation is
considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its
employees and is held responsible for their failure to act
accordingly.'
88
89
90
Stone, Where The Law Ends (1975)at p 73.
Gobert n 5 at p 404; see State v Morris and East Sussex Railway 23 NLJ 360 (1850). Green C J
refened to the 'body aggregate.'
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The doctrine continues to find favour in some modern American case
law In the case of United States v Bank ofNew EnglancP1 the company had
organised its operations in such a way that individual employees were
responsible for different operations in respect of matters which required to be
reported under the Currency Transaction Reporting Act. In finding the Bank
guilty, the court imputed knowledge to the Bank by aggregating the
knowledge of the employees, The court said:
'[I]f employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting
requirement, and B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet
of it, the bank knows them alL" A collective knowledge is
entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liability, ,.
Corporations compartmentalise knowledge, subdividing the
elements of specific duties and operations into smaller
components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the
corporation's knowledge of a particular operation.'92
In Britain there has been no judicial support for the aggregation theory
in criminal cases93 The one major case where the circumstances seemed most
appropriate for its adoption was in the cases that followed the Zeebrugge Ferry
disaster. However in R v HM Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner4
Bingham J said:
'Whether a defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the
91 821 F2d 844 (First Cir) cert denied 484 US 943 (1987).
us v Bank of New England supra at p 855.
But for tacit support of aggregation theory see Armstrong v Strain [1952] ] KB 232; London
Counliy heehold v Berkley Properties [1936] 2 All ER 1039; Woyka v London and Northern,
1922, 10 Lloyds Rep 110; Aggregation supp0l1ed by civil case of WB Anderson and Sons Ltd v
Rhodes (UVeipool) Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 850 cf Armstrong v Strain [1952] I KB 232; R v HM
Coronerfor East Kent ex p Spooner (1989) 88 Cr App R 10 at 16-7; Seaboard Offshore Ltd v
Secretary of State for Transport (1993) 1 WLR 1025; nor has Aggregation been accepted in
Commonwealth countries; see Colvin, n 91 at p 19. Specifically, it was rejected inR v Australasian
Films Ltd 29 CLR 195 (192]).
(1989) 88 Cr App R 10.
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ingredients of manslaughter must be established by proving the
necessary mens rea and actus reus of manslaughter against it or
him by evidence properly to be relied on against it or him. A case
against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence
against another defendant. The case against a corporation can
only be made by evidence properly addressed to showing guilt on
the part of the corporation as such.'
Gobert argues that aggregation provides an alternative and more
intellectually satisfying basis than the alter ego doctrine for attributing the
knowledge of a corporate official to the company.95 He does so on the basis
of the obvious limitations of the Natrass decision where the controlling mind
is equated with seniority of position. Under the aggregation theory more
junior officials and other servants of the company can form part of the
collective knowledge or mind of the company. Secondly, the aggregation
theory has appeal where no single individual within the company is in
possession of all the facts or information.96 Only by aggregating knowledge
does the fuller picture emerge. One of the consequences of this approach may
be that the sum of the knowledge may be greater than the parts. 97 Clearly,
there are dangers in such an approach and undoubtedly, the dangers have been
a contributory factor in judges such as Bingham J not accepting the concept
of aggregation. 98 Smith and Hogan oppose the doctrine of aggregation in
offences requiring intention, recklessness or knowledge whilst conceding it
may be applicable in negligence.99 Likewise, the Model Criminal Code
prepared by the Criminal Law Officers Committee in Canada hinted at
aggregation in negligence. lOo There are other features of aggregation which
95
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are troublesome. A primary question is 'whose knowledge should be
aggregated?' Would courts adopt the Natrass approach and simply view
senior executives as the individuals whose minds could be aggregated to form
the necessary mens rea? In many respects such an approach diminishes the
perceived benefit of aggregation as a model of criminal liability. The 'brains'
of the company are in a position to put in place the necessary accounting
procedures and policies whereby practices can be brought to the attention of
senior executives. If the aggregation model did not concede the possibility of
aggregating knowledge from outside the small coterie of senior executives,
those self-same executives could 'insulate a company from liability by
isolating themselves from their employees and the dangers of which the latter
would be aware.'IOl It seems only fair that where a company through its senior
officers puts in place appropriate systems and procedures that they should,
where the occasion merits it, be able to rely upon the defence of due diligence.
Aggregation reflects the 'atomistic' element in our common-sense
conception of organisations. It correctly 'insists on the critical dependence of
organisations, both phenomenally and normatively, on the actions and
interrelations of individual human beings. However, by equating organisations
to a homogeneous group of individuals, aggregation vastly understates the
extent and the significance of the complexity and inscrutability of that
dependence. ,102
In the prosecution resulting from the Zeebrugge Ferry disaster one finds
an illustration where the court rejected the notion ofaggregation of knowledge
to the company and dismissed the prosecution in part because the court was
not convinced that senior management ought to have known that there was a
serious risk of the shipping sailing with its bow doors open. Despite the fact
that some shipmasters had been concerned about sailings with the bow doors
open, there was no evidence that this had been brought to the attention of the
senior executives of P & O. The ability to defend on the basis of an absence
'one or more of its representatives, having an express or implied authority to direct, manage or
control its activity in the area concerned, and in take execution of that authority, fail, individually or
collectively, to the degree applicable to that offence, to exercise reasonable care to prevent an
occurrence. '(cI22(2)(b)).
101
102
Gobert, n 5 at p 406.
Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons And Organizations, (1986) at p 27.
57
Mountbatten lownal ofLegal Studies
of mens rea, essentially on the basis of 'blissful ignorance', has been
extensively criticised. Gobert for example argues, that 'the court converted a
mens rea bordering on 'wilful blindness' into an affirmative defence, and
rewarded culpable ignorance in a situation where it should have been
structuring the law to encourage corporate diligence'103
Lederman is critical of the aggregation theory on the basis that it might
lead to the conviction of legal bodies under far-reaching and absurd
circumstances claiming that 'The trend that allows the conviction of a
corporation by piecing together the conduct of different agents so as to form
the elements of one offence is the result of over-personification of corporate
bodies. ,104 Lederman is also critical of aggregation because of the lack of
concurrence in the integral components of the crime. There must in her
opinion be a causal relationship between the mens rea and the actus reus. She
argues:
'The artificial process of "piecing together" whereby the mens rea
and actus reus of an offense are attributed to the corporation
cannot satisfY the demands of the principle of concurrence. Even
the proponents of corporate criminal liability concede that the
corporate entity cannot by itself produce the elements necessary
to consummate the crime. These elements must first evolve in the
minds and actions of the perpetrators and only then, by way of
legal fiction of identification or imputation, are they attributed to
the corporation. Hence, the link required by the concurrence
principle must also be supplied first by the organ or agent and
only then can it be ascribed to the corporation. However, when
the knowledge vital to formation of the link is obviously not
manufactured by any human consciousness and it cannot,
therefore be claimed that the criminal mind stimulated the
forbidden act.'
Where aggregation is not possible Field and Jorg argue that 'Collective
103 Gobelt, n 5 at p 407; see also Field and larg, n 50 at p 161.
Lederman, n 8 at p 306.
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responsibility becomes lost in the crevices between the responsibilities of
individuals.'105 Its real merit lies in the somewhat more collectivist approach
than either vicarious liability or the identification doctrine. Nevertheless, in
common with those approaches, it suffers from the fact that it is but another
search for the essence of corporate liability rooted in, and routed through, the
individuals within that organisation.
Corporate Fault
All of the foregoing three theories suffer from limitations; they are
atomistic rather than holistic. They rest on the premise of designation of
individuals whose acts and mental states can be attributed to the company.
Corporate criminal liability is in all three a derivative form ofliability.106
All three theories suffer from the linkage of individual liability to corporate
liability through the concept of juristic person. It is because of these
limitations and from the desire to have an equitable premise f('lf corporate
criminal liability extendible to all forms of corporate criminal activity that
scholars have considered 'corporate fault' as a model. 107 The perception is that
the attribution of fault or blame in corporate crime more properly requires to
focus on collective corporate blame, rather than via the blameworthiness of
individuals. lffault underlines individual liability, why should it not precede
corporate liability ?108 The nexus between the corporations and the individuals
within them needs to be broken or, in any event, redefined. The preoccupation
of fitting individualised liability to the corporate form is fraught with
difficulty. History points to problems with all three of the foregoing 'atomistic'
models of corporate liability. These models have had limited success in
providing a juristic basis of liability for corporations' criminal acts. It is
dissatisfaction with all three that has led commentators to offer a fourth basis
on which criminal liability can be attributed to the corporate form. Fisse
105
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argues that:
'[I]n the case of corporate criminal responsibility, too little
attention has been paid to the possibility of improving the efficacy
and justice of its operation. To begin with, our existing ideas
upon criteria of ascription of responsibility are fragmentary and
primitive. This is true of the central issue of primary vs vicarious
responsibility, as well as the subsidiary problems raised by the
agency relationship between a corporate accused and the
individual person or persons whose conduct or fault is the subject
of attribution.'109
The theory of corporate fault is one essentially based on collective fault.
The company as a whole has liability not by the actions or intentions of
individuals within but rather through expressions of the collective will of the
company. The most obvious place for such expressions of intent to be found
is in company policies and procedures. The development of company policy
invariably requires the passage of that policy through an amalgam of
individuals and sub-groups within the organisation. Any policy so arrived at
may represent either a synthesis of views or a compromise of views. 110 Where
the company's mind is equated with the policies of the company, such policies
represent expressions of corporate intention. If through their operation, a
criminal act ensues, the theory says that the company will be liable. Clearly,
such a model of corporate fault can apply in a whole range of circumstances
and can be applied to both common law crimes and statutory crimes. The
obvious lacuna is where the company does not have formalised policies at all
or does not have policies pertaining to particular aspects of its activities. The
great benefit of moving towards to a corporate fault model of corporate crime
lies in the fact that it will loosen corporate criminal liability from its
'anthropomorphic moorings.' Gobert argues that:
'[C]ompanies should bear responsibility for crimes occurring in
109
110
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the course of their business without the need for the Crown to
attach fault to specific persons within the company. It should be
the company's responsibility to collect information regarding
potential dangers possessed by employees, collate the data, and
implement policies which will prevent reasonably foreseeable
risks from occurring. If the company is derelict in this duty and
a crime has resulted, it must share in the responsibility of the
resulting harm. The shift of judicial attention from individual to
corporate fault would have several side benefits. It would avoid
the evidentiary problem of tracing the strands of responsibility to
particular individuals, with its inherent dangers of scapegoating...
[S]hifting the onus of responsibility to the company would also
avoid the conundrum of aggregating a number of negligent acts
into a sum which is claimed to warrant a finding of recklessness
or gross negligence. If there is fault to be attributed to the
company, it is to be found in the way that the company organises
or operates its business affairs. It is often argued that a company
cannot act except through real persons - directors, officers and
employees. This may be so, but it need not control the law's
approach to corporate criminality. ,111
The trend towards corporate blameworthiness which Wells argues is
evident in Anglo-American jurisdictions, is primarily a response to the
inefficiency and unsatisfactory nature of the Natrass philosophy and vicarious
liability. 112 Whilst recognising a subtle drift from the Natrass philosophy
towards a newer model of corporate fault, Wells offers a cautionary note. She
contends that there has been:
'a subtle transformation of traditional judicial attitudes based on
the notion of director and officer control to a modern
understanding of the power of corporations to produce economic
Gobert. n 5 at pp 409-410
112 C Wells, 'The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox And Peninsularily', 1996,
Crim LR 545 at p 574
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and personal harm and the consequent importance of seeking to
control them through effective mechanisms of criminal law. 1113
Corporate fault is then a conceptually different approach to corporate
criminality:
'The company is treated as a distinct organic entity whose "mind"
is embodied in the policies it has adopted. Corporate policy is
often different from the sum of the inputs of those who helped to
formulate the policy, and typically is the product of either
synthesis of views or a compromise among competing positions.
Policy may also reflect the company's corporate ethos. This ethos
which is often unwritten, may have been forged by founders of
the company who are no longer actively involved in its day-to-day
affairs. When company policy or corporate ethos leads to the
commission of a crime, the company should be liable in its own
right and not derivatively. 1114
The attraction of such an approach is that it takes one away from the
actus reus/mens rea polemic. Individualism is supplanted by what Gobert
calls a more expansive view ofcausation. It also has appeal in the fact that it
moves away from the application of conventional criminal liability to the
corporate form. 115 Gobert sees distinct advantages in this in that it will take
away the problems associated with the 'courts' attempts to squeeze corporate
square pegs into the round holes of criminal law doctrines which were devised
with individuals in mind.'1l6 According to Gobert's own corporate fault
model, the 'focus would be on the creation of risks likely to lead to the
occurrence of serious harm. If the harm in fact materialised, the company's
liability would be for the failure to prevent the harm rather than for the
It}
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62
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
substantive crime itself.' The company has an obligation to prevent crime
under this model. In practice this means their development of polices and
their implementation and the establishment of corporate ethos. As Gobert
argues 'Mens rea is one way, but not the only way, of getting at the issue of
blameworthiness.' 117 The defence for a company facing criminal liability
under a corporate fault model would be that of due diligence. Gobert argues
that the burden of proving due diligence should fall upon the corporation. In
satisfying the test of due diligence Gobert suggests that the courts should
adopt a test which clearly has its origins in health and safety law, with a
balance being struck between the risk created against the social utility of the
activity weighed against the cost and practicability of eliminating the risk.
Gobert is unclear whether due diligence should be delineated by Parliament
or by the judiciary. What he is clear about is that due diligence should be
evidenced not just by senior management but rather by the organisational
structure. 118
Whilst recognising the importance of the relationship between
individual liability and corporate liability, what is required is a distinction of
both and for autonomous corporate culpability disassociated from culpability
transmitted through corporate officials. Those who argue strongly for
corporate fault draw support from the work of French and Dan Cohen. 119
Their approach presupposes that 'companies of sufficient organisational
complexity develop over time an intentionality and reasons for acting which
exist in a realm separate from the individual intentions and motivations of the
individuals currently connected with the company.'120 Policies contain basic
'I'
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belief and goal statements121 and as such, intent can be fixed to policies, rules
and practices. 122 A problem with corporate fault is that organisations inhere
as 'much in its informal practices as in its official decisions.,m Moreover, one
of the evident problems in deducing corporate attitudes and culpability from
policies is that 'companies may by the setting of their institutional priorities,
create a climate which discourages obedience to known rules'. 124
Colvin has argued that mere evidence ofcriminogenic corporate culture
should provide a sufficient fault element for those offences that can ordinarily
be committed recklessly. 125 Such a proposition requires clarification of how
one will establish criminogenic culture. If it involves a pre-trial view of past
convictions it may wreak too much of the sins of the past being visited upon
the corporation. There will require to be a clear understanding that in looking
to past indiscretions one is merely seeking evidence of practices which exhibit
corporate philosophy. Even that approach may be far too controversial. Fisse
and Braithwaite claim that the notion of corporate blameworthiness has been
accepted and now the real challenge is to find a workable concept of corporate
P French, Collective And Cmporate Responsibility. (1979) at p 57 op cit.
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fault. 126 With their support of reactive cOr'porate fault they very much endorse
post hoc assessment of the corporation's blameworthiness. In a British
context, instinctively one feels that assessment of corporate fault will require
to be a contemporary assessment of corporations' policies, practices,
procedures, ethos or culture, but that corporations should be afforded the
protection from revisitation of past offences as a basis of identifYing corporate
fault. Bucy offers a variation, arguing that corporate fault might be founded
upon the basis of corporate ethos, which she suggests might be deduced from
the amount of compliance-education the company gives its employees, its
attitudes to compensation and indemnification, and its practices. 127 Systems
analysis also offers interesting possibilities. 128 British courts are reasonably
well versed in dealing with offences under section 2 of the Health and Safety
at Work Act 1974 where employers can be found guilty of not operating a safe
system.
According to Wells, Seaboard Marine and Tesco v London Borough of
Brent demonstrate a realism in the courts129 that society appears to need the
concept oforganisational blame. 130 Her view is that some of the recent cases
display judicial perception as to the irrelevance of the identification theory to
corporate risk taking. 131 She argues that:
'legal ideas in this sphere have matured from reliance on the
agency identification dyad (represented by the vicarious and direct
routes to liability) to the faint tremors of an emerging recognition
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that company policies and systems might form the basis for the
ascription of criminal responsibility.'l32
Colvin similarly adopts the view that criminal law should be made to
focus directly on the issue of organisational culpability:
'if the shackles of derivative liability were removed, corporations
would face substantial exposure to liability for their omissions...
it might be appropriate to increase this exposure through the
imposition of a general duty upon corporations to guard against
their operations causing harm and their structures and resources
being used to cause harm. ,133
Interestingly, the new proposal for an offence of corporate-killing seeks
to develop the concept of organisational blameworthiness. 134 Whilst this is a
welcome development, it still requires definition and elucidation. One danger
may be the desire to equate this simply with managerial failings. In the
process we may simply be reinventing the Natrass philosophy by the back
door. The organisation as a collectivity is more than its managers. Corporate
fault must look to collective failing rather than the failings on one section of
the organisation.
Conclusion
It does appear that 'There is clearly dissatisfaction with the traditional
derivative models of corporate liability and interest in exploring alternatives.
As yet, the direction forward remains unsettIed.'135 For the corporate offender,
the normal route of criminal attribution based upon moral fault is fraught with
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difficulty but sunnountable for all that. The concepts of power and acceptance
form the basis of a model of liability in the United Kingdom. Power and
acceptance carry with them hierarchical connotations. As we have seen in
several recent English cases, reference to the hierarchy provides nonsensical
results.
For all the criticisms of vicarious liability and the identification doctrine,
they have endured because we have not as yet formulated an intellectually
satisfying basis on which to attach liability. Corporate fault seemingly
represents the solution but it too requires some refinement. Foerschler
summarises the nature of the dilemma by saying that the atomistic view, while
recognising that a corporation is an aggregate of individuals, underestimates
the added 'complexity and inscrutability' of the corporate structure itself. At
the same time, a strict holistic approach exaggerates the unity of the
corporation.'136 Identification, warts and all, continues to hold primacy in the
United Kingdom courts but our attachment to identification as a doctrine
should not be complete. The recent attempts to develop a more holistic
approach to liability reflecting corporate culpability are to be welcomed as a
more satisfactory basis on which to ascribe liability. Eser has claimed that 'it
is... a pennanent obligation of criminal jurisprudence to refine the principles
of criminal liability. 1137 In reconstructing corporate criminal liability the task
is slightly more challenging and that is to devise an altogether more
satisfactory basis, one based on corporate fault, for the ascription of liability
to the corporation. Only in that way can corporate criminal liability in the
United Kingdom be placed on a proper intellectual footing.
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